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A slow evolution in the matter of compensatory damages has tended
gradually to exclude the notion of penalty, which was first received in
the law under the influence of the desire for vengeance. In its stead
the view has been adopted that in the civil law, as distinguished from
the criminal law, the sanction for a wrongful act-that is, for a tort
or a breach of contract-should be so measured as merely to restore
the person injured to his former position. This evolution began in
the Roman law and has reached its full development only in modem
legislation.
The theory appears simple. It has the technical imprint of a vigor-
ous doctrine which is encountered in both the economic and the
artistic ideas prevalent at the end of the eighteenth century and the
beginning of the nineteenth. This order of thought is appropriate to
the fine strength of the period of the empire. It is the criminal law,
not the civil law, which is concerned with penal ideas and with the
prevention in the future of wrongful acts. What, therefore, is the
basis of the sanction of a wrongful act? If it is to obtain security
from the wrongdoer, he could be condemned only if chargeable with
a fault, thus taking into account the subjective point of view; whereas
a sanction is by nature objective. It must seek to cure an injury,
nothing more. What, indeed, may the injured person demand? His
security requires merely that he be restored to the condition in which
he would have been had the wrongful act not taken place.




Let us assume that a man's house has been set on fire by the negli-
gence of a neighbor. A new house will be built for the owner, or
he will be given money compensation to cover the cost of rebuilding.
Or let us assume that a contractor has not done certain work within
the period agreed upon. He must pay a sum of money sufficient to
make good both the loss caused by his delay, and the loss of benefit
which would have been realized by his prompt completion of the work.
That is sufficient.
This notion that the person injured may claim the equivalent of the
damnumn emergens and of the lucrum cessans is, so to speak, classic
in the codes of Europe and of America. The French Civil Code2 pro-
vides that "damages are due as a rule to the creditor for the loss which
he -has suffered and the gain of which he has been deprived." The
Italian,3 the Venezuelan,4 and the Dutch5 Civil Codes contain like
provisions. The Spanish Civil Code is inspired by the same principle,
providing6 that "the indemnity for an injury comprises not only the
amount of the loss which has been sustained but also the amount of
the profits of which the creditor has been deprived." The Portuguese
Civil Code stipulates :7
"Indemnity may consist in the restitution of the thing or of the
sum which constituted the principal object of the obligation, or in the
restitution of that thing or sum and of the gain of which the creditor
has been deprived in. consequence of the nonperformance of a con-
tract."
The Italian Civil Code likewise provides that reparation for an
injury arising out of either the complete or the partial failure to per-
form an obligation must comprehend the harm done and the gain lost.
The most recent codes embody the same principles. The Japanese
Code$ provides that
"the claim for damages has as its object the reparation of the injury
which results from nonperformance according to the ordinary course
of events."
The German Civil Code9 provides that
"whoever is bound to make good an injury must restore the state of
things which would have existed if the circumstances which gave rise
to the obligation to make compensation had not occurred."
Further :10 "the injury to be made good also comprises lost profits."
'Art. 1149. "Art. 706.
" Art 1227. 'Art. 416.
' Art. 1293. 'Art. 249.
'Art 1308. 'o Art. 252.
'Art. 1io6.
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The revised Swiss Federal Code of Obligations includes the same
principles and provides"' that "when the creditor cannot obtain the
performance of an obligation or can obtain only an imperfect per-
formance, the debtor is bound to make good the resulting injury."
The English law admits that
"where a party sustains a loss by reason of a breach of contract, he is,
so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation, with
respect to damages, as if the contract had been performed."'
2
When special provisions of a code deal with non-contractual injuries
inflicted on another, the same principles are generally followed. Thus,
the French Civil Code' 3 provides that "whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another is obliged to make it good." This provision
is embodied in the codes of many other countries."
The principle of compensatory reparation is, therefore, an idea
which has a strong foundation in modem law. When it is examined
more closely, however, it will be observed that its force is not absolute,
and that it encounters either practical obstacles, or else principles of
a certain social utility which have not full validity but which, neverthe-
less, have their part to play in the complex combination which is pre-
sented by the solution of any social problem.
I
As a matter of fact it is not always possible to replace the creditor
obligee in exactly the same position as if the wrongful act,-namely,
the tort or the breach of contract,-had not occurred. When com-
pensation is made in kind, the restored res is again exposed to the
same chances of destruction as the original res. This is the case when
a vessel which has collided with another by the latter's fault, is so
repaired by the owner of the ship at fault as to permit it again to
navigate.
But more often, either because it is impossible to restore the former
state of things, as where a person is injured bodily, or in order to
avoid a discussion with reference to the execution of a contract, com-
pensation for the wrongful act is made in the form of a money
indemnity. How is it possible to make the sum a true compensation
uArt. 97.
'Robinson v. Harman (1848) I Exch. 85o, 855, per Parke, B.
I Art. 1382.
"Textually reproduced in Art. x428 of the Dutch Civil Code, Art. 15i of the
Italian Civil Code, and Art. 1217 of the Venezuelan Civil Code. Art. 2314 of
the Chilean Code and Art. 7o9 of the Japanese Civil Code contain similar pro-
visions.
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for the injury sustained? Here again the result may be attained if
the only uncertain element is the duration of the injury. The court
may order periodic payments which shall continue as long as injury
is suffered. If an individual has been the victim of an accident and
has been temporarily incapacitated, though the injury will ultimately
leave no trace, it is easy to accord him a return which will terminate
the day he resumes work. It is likewise easy to make good an injury
of limited duration in the enjoyment of property.
The injury may be uncertain in its extent as well as in its duration.
Occasionally it is possible to determine, in spite of variations of fact,
what would have happened in the absence of the wrongful act. Thus,
an accident may lead to disability to work, followed by periods of
good health which are interrupted by relapses. We may a posteriori
fix at the end of each year the indemnity which may be due.
But the measure of damages may be uncertain because even a
posteriori it is not possible to determine exactly what would have
happened in the absence of the wrongful act. When a person has
been rendered incapable of work because of an accident, how can we
foresee the business opportunities that he may have lost? He might
have been offered an excellent position, but, in view of the accident,
the offer will not have been made.
Two recently enacted codes have begun to take account of these
difficulties. The Japanese Civil Code of April 28, 1896, provides :15
"The claim for damages has as its object the reparation of the injury
which results from nonperformance according to the ordinary course
of events."
In the same spirit the German Civil Code of 1896 provides
6 that
"the injury to be made good includes lost profit. Profit is deemed
to have been lost when it might reasonably have been expected accord-
ing to the natural course of events or according to the particular cir-
cumstances of the case, e. g., according to the preparations or pro-
visions made."
These two articles express a reasonable idea which may be accepted
in countries where statutes contain no provision on the matter. It is
informed by a practical consideration of the probable in life as the
equivalent of the certain.17 If a crop is destroyed before its maturity
by the fault of a person, it is natural to presume that the crop, properly
cared for, would have been harvested by its owner.
But if the general principle is admissible, it encounters serious diffi-
culties in certain cases. In practice, life imposes the necessity of
Art. 416.
1 Art. 252-
'A. Albinozzi, Studio sul danno non patrimoniale (3d ed.) 9o.
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considering as true that which is probable; but this entirely pragmatic
opinion must yield before realities. Let us suppose that certain trees
in a privately owned forest have been unlawfully cut down, but before
damages are claimed, lightning causes the destruction of the entire
forest so that the felled trees would have been and are unavoidably lost
to their owner. May the owner bring an action against the original
wrongdoer? The question may be posited in another form. To
appreciate the existence or the extent of an injury, it is necessary to
place one's self constructively at the time when it is inflicted, or when
the magistrate, upon personal inspection, or the parties, by agreement,
make an estimate of the injury. It appears logical always to yield
to the lesson of facts. If the negligence of a person causes the loss
of goods which at the moment of their destruction were worth a
thousand francs, the owner of these goods may claim i2oo francs if
it is established that at the time of judgment such an increase in the
value of the goods has taken place as to justify the claim. Con-
versely, the person at fault will have to restore only 8oo francs if it
is proved that the market price of the goods declined to that extent
after their destruction. The only inconvenience of this solution is
that the injured person, in claiming his indemnity after the lapse of
a period of time, prolongs the uncertainty of the wrongdoer's risks.
But the wrongdoer may always offer the injured person the actual
amount that has been lost. The danger, therefore, is minimal, and
it is hardly profitable to discuss it at length.
In addition to the probable injury, there is the possible injury which
might have resulted in consequence of a series of circumstances of
which one may only assert that they might have occurred. By reason
of some error or negligent act, let us say, a race-horse carried by a
railroad does not arrive in time to take part in the race. In estimat-
ing the damages, must we take into account the prize which the horse
might have won? Similarly, at the moment of the drawing of a
lottery one of the numbers in the lottery is negligently missing: may
the holder of that number claim damages, and how much shall they be?
To give a reasonable solution to these difficulties we must, so far as
possible, avoid two dangers. On the one hand, it is an exaggeration
to assimilate the mere chance of winning a prize to a certainty or a
probability. Indemnity should not be a matter of profit, else the
injury will be sought after; this is, of course, contrary to the interests
of society. On the other hand, is it not a somewhat crude policy to
omit taking account of uncertain injuries? How many acts of man
constitute merely a speculation upon the chance of gain!
A purely mathematical solution is conceivable. The table of proba-
bilities might be placed under contribution, and this method of reaching
precise results would be alluring to people who think it possible to
deduce principles of law from rigorous calculations. But this method
would be dangerous. Mathematics, of all sciences, is the least in con-
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tact with the complex realities of life. To calculate chances is to
render certain phenomena more apparent to the spirit, but not to fix
their uncertain shapes.
The system of indemnity here encounters an impassable obstacle.
The court may indemnify, but only by an act of the will: the court
creates a reaction against the wrong instead of making it good.
French jurisprudence has chosen a more prudent course, and it
may be said that it does not take cognizance of speculative injuries.
Thus, with reference to a race-horse which was unduly over-weighted,
it has been decided that
"there is in the outcome of races a certain unforeseen element, the
winning or losing of a horse usually being not the result of a specific
determined cause, but of a combination of diverse circumstances."'"
Perhaps this solution is too cautious, for it hardly attains its aim.
This is merely acting as if the wrongful act had not occurred. To
take account of only the certain injury is to take account of only the
palpable injury. It would be better to renounce the idea of compensa-
tory indemnity and to admit a moderate reaction against probable
injuries.
These conclusions establish that the grant of an indemnity abso-
lutely compensatory of the injury frequently encounters practical
obstacles. These obstacles are not so numerous, however, because
most codes provide that damages ought to comprehend nothing but
the immediate and direct consequences of the nonperformance of an
obligation. 19 Thus, the legislatures have adopted an easy method of
evading the appreciation of certain damages, and at bottom they have
admitted that the injury ought in certain cases to have as its sanction
a pecuniary compensation not adequate to the loss sustained.
II
The principle of assigning to the victim of the wrong as adequate a
compensation as possible encounters obstacles other than those of fact.
Under some circumstances the social utility of the principle is con-
tested.
The theory of indemnity is, after all, a special aspect of the equaliz-
ing concept. This theory simultaneously presents the strength and
the weakness of that concept. It would appear to be as simple as the
theory of equivalents. The measure of the rights of the injured party
' Nancy (Dec. 1o, 1912) Gazette du palais 1912, 2, 525; and similarly, Bor-
deaux (July 15, 1912) ibid. 1912, 2, 526.
"Argentine Civ. Code, Art 520; Chilean Civ. Code, Art. 1558; French Civ.
Code, Art 1151; Italian Civ. Code, Art. 229; Mexican Civ. Code, Art 1466"
Portuguese Civ. Code, Art. 7o7; Spanish Civ. Code, Art. Io7.
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will often be easy to determine, since it is fixed by a material element,
namely, the damage done. On the other hand, the theory of indemnity
corresponds to one of the primordial necessities of social existence-
the necessity of security20 conceived in its most simple form, that is,
in the desire to maintain vested interests. When a right is recognized
by law, it is best protected by enacting that if the right is violated, it
will be re-established in its integrity, so that the wrongful act will, so
to speak, be effaced. The possessor of the right then feels entire
security in making use of his property. He knows that the value of
the property is at least guaranteed against wrongful acts. He finds
therein a cause of tranquillity and an inducement to economic activity.
The system appears to be a compromise between the claims of the
victim to obtain an exaggerated sum of money, and the desire of the
person at fault to pay as little as possible. The judge in fixing the
measure of damages seems to take the position of a reasonable third
party; he satisfies the victim of the injury, who cannot demand more
than he has lost, and his estimate is acceptable to the wrongdoer, who
must bear the loss. Compensatory indemnity constitutes, therefore,
a just measure of sanction. On the other hand, the theory of com-
pensatory reparation has the weakness of all equalizing theories.
These theories constitute an aspect of social life and often have a
material aspect. They neglect the dynamic side, and consequently
they do not constitute a forceful lever of social activity. This weak-
ness, however, appears here without inconvenience; for even if the
theory of indemnity does little to compel the person at fault to refrain
from such wrongful acts, still it is recompensed by the penalty.
The indemnity, by the mere fact that it is a sanction, that it con-
stitutes a reaction against the act committed, may sometimes deter
repetitions. But that is not always true. The damage may be small,
yet the fault may be great. This happens when there is an attempt
whose effect is limited, or when the injury, being immaterial, hardly
lends itself to a considerable compensation. But the penalty seems to
make good this defect. If the wrongdoer is chargeable with a grave
fault, the criminal law intervenes, having no aim other than to pre-
vent a repetition of the wrong. It may proceed by way of general
prevention (the theory of intimidation) or it may act upon the spirit
of the wrongdoer himself (the theory of punishment).
The special purpose given to the indemnity and to the penalty is
informed by a good analytic spirit, the past being effaced by the
indemnity, the future being safeguarded by the punishment. But like
all simple theories, these ideas do not embrace all variations of reality;
the variations are fused into a uniform color. Upon reflection, it is
See on this subject the present author's Notions fundamentales du droit
privi, 63 et seq.; Analysis of Fundamental Notions, in Modern French Legal
Philosophy, 347, 4x8 et seq.
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clear that cases exist in which it is fitting that a civil court substitute
for compensatory reparation a pecuniary penalty, under the name of
punitive or exemplary damages. 21
This institution is not a deduction from a single idea, but is rather
the point of convergence of concurrent difficulties. Thus it happens
that according to circumstances it may present greater or less force,
because under various hypotheses it may call to its aid stronger or
weaker governing ideas.
It must be admitted that at first glance the idea of punitive damages,
that is, a penalty exceeding the harm done, appears shocking. It
involves what might seem to be an unjust enrichment on the part of
the victim. This objection would be decisive if a pecuniary penalty
always constituted a complete reparation of the injury. But perhaps
the injury cannot be compensated by a pecuniary indemnity and can
give rise only to a counter payment (as when an individual is
slandered without suffering any loss of credit, or when a person is
subjected, by the death of a near relative, to mental suffering with-
out any property loss) ; then the transition is insensible between the
indemnity looking only to a compensation of the loss sustained, and
that looking to a punishment of the wrongdoer.
It is easier to pass from one to the other when we perceive that
the domains of penal and of civil law-which have been gradually dis-
tinguished in the course of civilization-are not absolutely separate
categories, and that it is proper to establish intermediate zones. The
penalty is a powerful instrument which must be used judiciously. In
addition to the public penalty pronounced by the criminal courts, it
is proper in some cases to establish a private penalty (punitive
damages) pronounced by the civil courts, the imposition of which
may be demanded only by the person injured. Acts affected with a
private penalty thus appear as quasi crimes, placed in an intermediate
zone between the jurisdiction of the civil law and that of the criminal
law. It may have been observed that there is a certain correlation
between the cases in which a private penalty is assessed and those
characterized as criminal offenses. Indeed, the law at times pro-
nounces a public penalty by reason of the grave consequences of an
act,-as in the case of homicide or assault and battery; such acts are
punishable whether intentional or due to gross negligence. Occa-
sionally the law is concerned particularly with the intention of the
defendant, and it punishes only if criminal intent is found. Thus,
the taking of another's property is not usually punishable if the taker
has made a mistake without wrongful intent.
Cases in which it is proper to impose a private penalty are some-
times those in which the act appears to involve an element of risk, as
'See Le Hugueney, L'idee de peine privie en droit contemporain (Paris,
1904).
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in the case of a rash accusation; and sometimes those in which the
defendant intended to injure, or at least was conscious of injuring,
as in the case of defamation, seduction, or a violation of individual
liberty.
These are, indeed, the principal cases in which the English law
imposes a private penalty under the name of exemplary damages.2
These cases present examples of wrongful acts for which a public
penalty would constitute a rather harsh measure; they are, neverthe-
less, acts which disturb the social order and individual security
simultaneously. The difficulty of estimating the loss, combined with
the desire of adjudging these acts to be serious, but not criminal, leads
logically to a notion of private penalty. The benefit assigned to the
person injured does not shock the legal sense, for we may fix with
precision the point at which the benefit shall stop. Special reasons
for imposing a private penalty may also exist when the wrongdoer
has derived from his act a benefit greater than the injury inflicted.
It is unjust for a wrongdoer to preserve even a part of such benefit.
It is more equitable to grant it to the victim. It is good legal policy
to solve the problem in this way in order that no advantage may ever
be derived from wrongdoing. Particular reasons likewise exist when
it becomes necessary for a loss to be borne by one of two litigants:
thus, it is more reasonable to make the losing party pay court costs.
The reasons for imposing a private penalty would be weaker if we
were dealing with an intentional injury which appeared scarcely to
disturb the social order, or with an act having grave consequences,
but which arose from only a slight fault. Here the concept of
indemnity, looking to the restitution of conditions as they would have
been had the wrongful act not occurred, is presented with such force
as to be invulnerable to attack. Do the preceding arguments irrevo-
cably indicate the principles according to which the rule of punitive
damages must be applied rather than that of reparation? We think
not. The evolution of institutions cannot be permanently arrested.
They have a value only so far as they find support in the general
psychological condition; and this condition has both permanent and
temporary elements. It will require either a cruder civilization to
extend the penal domain, or the creation of an altogether new inspira-
tion in order that new theories may present themselves.
III
The notion of compensatory reparation, with the idea of private
penalty superimposed, is threatened, on the other hand, by the principle
"See Italian Penal Code, Art 38: in case of attack upon a person's honor,
the court may pronounce a pecuniary penalty beyond any damage sustained.
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of reparation by way of forfeiture (liability without fault) which has
been recognized under the statutes of numerous European countries,
especially in the matter of workmen's compensation.
If we examine the numerous laws which have accorded an action
for indemnity to every workman injured by an accident in the course
of his employment, we shall establish, in addition to this grant of a
right of action even in the absence of proof of fault on the part of
the employer, another feature not less important, namely, a limitation
imposed upon the claims of the workman.
It is at once evident that the indemnity assured to the workman-or
to his family in case of a fatal accident-is considerably less than the
loss sustained. According to French law, 23 a workman totally and
permanently disabled may claim a compensation equal to two-thirds
of his annual wage. If partially yet permanently disabled, he is
entitled to a pension equal to half his former earning capacity. In
case of an accident followed by death, a pension is granted to certain
dependent heirs not exceeding a total of 6o% of the annual wage of
the victim.
In Italy,2' the compensation in case of permanent total disability is
equal to six times the annual earnings, but never less than 3ooo lire;
in case of partial disability, it is equal to six times the annual earning
capacity, but not less than 5oo lire. In case of death it is equal to
five times the annual wage. In Belgium, 25 a workman permanently
disabled is awarded an annual allowance of 5o% of his annual wage.
In case of death his dependents are given a sum representing a capi-
talized annuity equal to 30% of his earnings, calculated upon the
basis of his age at death. In Spain,26 a totally disabled workman is
entitled to an indemnity equal to his wages for two years; this is
reduced by one-fourth if he is able to take up another occupation. If
the accident is fatal a sum equal at most to two years' earnings is
granted.
It would be easy to continue this enumeration and to show that the
statutes, either in order to avoid placing too heavy a charge upon
employers, or else to encourage workmen to be careful, grant the
victim of an accident a sum of money considerably less than his earn-
ings, and generally less than the loss sustained, for the workman may
have expected in time an increase in his wages. Not only do the new
cases of liability created in the absence of fault on the part of the
employer constitute attenuated hypotheses of liability, but the tradi-
tional theory of liability in case of fault is also greatly limited.
'Art 3, law of Apr. 9, ig9.
"4Art. 9, law of Mar. 17, i8 , amended June 29, i9o3.
'Art. 4, law of Dec. 24, i9o3.
" Art 4, law of Jan. 30, 1900.
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The Belgian law provides clearly
27
"Nothing herein derogates from the general rules of civil liability
when the accident was intentionally caused by the employer. Except
for this limitation, damages arising out of accidents to workmen can
be collected from the employer only to the extent of the compensation
fixed by the present law."
The same provision is to be found in German law.
28
The French law of 189829 provides that "workmen and employees
cannot avail themselves, in case of accident in the course of their
employment, of any provisions other than those contained in the
present law." These provisions constitute the tariff indicated above,
which is always applicable except in case of the inexcusable fault of
the employer,-a fact which permits of a larger indemnity not to
exceed, however, the amount of the annual wage.30 The Spanish
statute31 seems likewise to exclude actions arising out of a fault- estab-
lished by the common law.
The Italian law32 provides that the ordinary civil responsibility can
be invoked only if there has been "a penal conviction for the act which
caused the accident," or, if the penal action is quashed, if the civil
court determines the existence of facts which would have constituted
a misdemeanor. In the same spirit the Swiss statute33 provides that
the judge is not bound by the legal maximum in case the corporal
injury or death of the victim was caused by an act of the employer
susceptible of being made the basis of a penal action.
The English Workmen's Compensation Act of August 6, I897,34 is
more favorable to the workman, and provides that "when the injury
was caused by the personal negligence or wilful act of the employer,"
the Act in no way affects the employer's civil liability, but the work-
man may, at his option, either claim compensation under the Act, or
pursue his common-law remedies. The statutes of certain other
countries-for instance, that of Russia of June 2, 903,-contain no
provisions on the matter.
To sum up, there appears to be in European legislation a marked
tendency to admit in favor of the workman only a limited responsi-
bility on the part of the employer, unless certain grave faults may be
ascribed to the employer which give rise to a common-law liability.
=Art 22.
Art. 135, law of June 30, 1900.
' Art. 2, amended Mar. 22, I902.
Art. 20.
Art. 16, law of Jan. 3o, goo.
2 Art 22.
"Art. 6, law of June 25, 1881.
"6o & 61 Vict ch. 37, s. 2 (b).
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These results are important from .two points of view. First, the
modem rules in cases of accidents to workmen embrace one of the
most important causes of liability. Again, they correspond to a
general tendency of modern law to mask questions of social responsi-
bility either by adopting a general solution in the case of unfortunate
events such as accidents and sickness, or by according to the victim in
all cases a certain assistance based upon social solidarity. The ordi-
nary liability exists only in case of grave fault. Thus, in legislation
of an objective character, the subjective consideration of fault still
retains a certain place. Considering the whole matter, we must con-
clude that the modem tendency often results indirectly in replacing
compensatory reparation by a reparation admittedly incomplete. In
contrast to the private penalty (punitive damages), where the sum
granted exceeds the injury, in these cases the victim is allotted a
sum smaller than the loss sustained.
IV
From the preceding pages, it will have been established that the
acceptance in law of the principle of indemnity constituted an advance
because it substituted for the ideas of vengeance-which often
exceeded the purpose. which law should have properly pursued-a
sanction which, though milder, was usually sufficient to satisfy the
victim and even to prevent a recurrence of the wrongful act.
It would, however, be wrong to believe that the general application
of the idea of compensatory indemnity is a definite stage in the evolu-
tion of law. Because of the attractive notion that it takes account of
all losses sustained, the theory of indemnity presupposes a knowledge
of numerous facts arising out of the fault committed, and requires
minute research, leading finally to certain impassable obstacles. On
the other hand, it encounters limitations of an opposite kind. Sub-
jective considerations have led, in the case of some grave faults
where the damage is difficult to measure, to the resurrection of the
private penalty. The psychological analysis has here resumed its
control over the objective determination of the damage.
Moreover, other objective considerations have been substituted for
the already objective point of view of the compensatory indemnity.
It has been sought to accord assistance to every victim of certain social
events, such as accidents to workmen. The principle of compensatory
indemnity has been maintained only where grave fault exists; it thus
assumes a certain subjective basis.
The person entitled to indemnity may, therefore, lay claim to a sum
which is in some cases greater than the injury sustained, in other
cases, smaller. Ought we to conclude that the concept of compensa-
tory indemnity, assaulted from two opposite sides, is destined to dis-
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appear? By no means. It is appropriate to remark that between
cases in which compensatory reparation has been applied, and those
in which some other system has penetrated, for example, the private
penalty or indemnity by way of forfeiture (liability without fault),
there is a broad line of division occupied by the category of cases in
which we apply the idea of fault,-especially, fault characterized as
grave or intentional.
But while the notion of grave fault often leads to an admission of
a private penalty, it leads, on the other hand, in the case of accidents
to workmen, to the retention of the idea of compensatory reparation.
The notion of fault has not, therefore, a convergent action in the vari-
ous cases, leading to the substitution of a general system for the older
system.
It cannot be said that the future will see the complete reaffirmation
of such a single system of civil sanction for wrongful acts. So far
as we may rely upon the past to predict the future, we may assume that
we shall witness a struggle of more material and ontological con-
ceptions of compensatory reparation on the one hand, with more
spiritual and teleological conceptions of severity with respect to fault
on the other hand. The former by their apparent simplicity, the latter
by their social utility, have such strength that it is doubtful whether
any of them can ever be definitely conquered. It is curious to note
that while recent writers treating of the basis of legal liability have
preferred the objective theory of risk to the subjective theory of
fault,35 subjective theories have been admitted with respect to the sanc-
tion for wrongful acts.
It seems, therefore, that, as on many other points of law, the
question before us is not a question of principle but a question of
delimitation. The theory of compensatory indemnity is sufficiently
strong to survive, but too weak to rule alone.
Is it possible to fix the limit towards which the theory tends, and
to fix a point at which it will remain stable after its diverse oscillations?
This limit cannot be established once for all; we thus differ from what
eighteenth century partisans of the school of natural law would have
thought. It can only be said that the theory bears a close relation to
the average social morality. Subjective considerations become less
essential as the feeling that it is not necessary to commit faults grows
more intense. If in any industry where the workmen's compensation
legislation is applied, precautions ordinarily taken are sufficient to make
faults exceptional, a statute establishing reparation by way of for-
feiture (liability without fault) might command great authority or
even be solely applicable, unless the desire to favor workmen leads to
the imposition of heavy burdens of liability upon employers.
' Cf. Tesseire, Essai dune thiorie generale sur le fondement de la respona-
bilit,.
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If attacks upon honor and the feelings are rare, we may have less
reason to be concerned with private penalties (punitive damages). In
other cases, however, they will be given a greater extension, unless,
going beyond, we admit in such cases a wide application of public
penalties, and decide that they are incompatible with private penalties.
The law on the present subject appears to be in a state of flux between
certain limits, and under the domination of a few theories rather com-
plex in their application.
